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GLOBALIZATION REPORT CARDS FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATORS: NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET STANDARDS FOR 
INFORMATION SHARING AND COOPERATION AND THE 
PREVENTION OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
Andrea M. Corcoran* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007–2009 credit crisis and the threatened breakdown of the 
world’s financial system moved gaps in regulation, and the capacity of 
international cooperation to fill those gaps, to the top of the agenda of 
global leaders—both politicians and regulators.  The rescue of the 
financial regulatory community from its inability to anticipate, assess, 
measure, and mitigate, if not prevent, toxic synergies among multi-
national financial services providers still burdens the public purse in 
almost every jurisdiction.  Indeed, although recovery appears to be on 
the horizon, the lingering memory of the cost, and the assumed 
inevitability, of that rescue continues to threaten the economy, the 
policies, and even the incumbency of presiding policymakers and 
regulatory institutions.1 
Multiple parties, both national and international, have offered a series 
of reforms to cure the deficiencies leading to the crisis, including among 
others: the G-20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the European Commission (EC), the 
United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.).2  Notable among 
 *   Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; Principal, Align International, LLC. 
 1. See, for example, the planned reorganization of the UK Financial Services Authority (UK 
FSA), to commence January 11, 2011 and conclude in 2012, which was part of the platform on which 
the new Conservative Government campaigned.  The proposed changes, now underway, transfer 
prudential supervision back to the Bank of England (BOE).  See Financial Regulatory Forum, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/07/26/factbox-uk-fleshes-out-financial-
supervisory-shake-up/ (July 26, 2010, 12:48 EDT). 
 2. See, e.g., G-20 Leader’s Statement, The Pitt. Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at 
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm; INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf; see also G-20, G-20 WORKING GROUP 3: 
REFORM OF THE IMF: FINAL REPORT ¶¶ 18.4–18.6 (2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/ 
g20_wg3_010409.pdf; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/ 
de_larosiere_report_en.pdf; THE FIN. SERVS. AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
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these proposals is that of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)—created 
in April 20093 as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)—to 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ 
turner_review.pdf; THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf; 
The White House Proposal, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/amendments-to-the-bank-
holding-company-act#document/p1; H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf 
(the so-called Volcker Rule or modified return to the Glass–Steagall limitations on proprietary trading 
within deposit-taking banks); S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s3217as.txt.pdf (related and now adopted 
legislation).  Among other things, these include recommendations with respect to: (1) defining high 
quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality; (2) strengthening accounting standards; (3) reforming 
compensation practices; (4) improving OTC derivatives risk management; (5) addressing cross-border 
issues and systemically important financial institutions; and (6) strengthening adherence to international 
standards. 
 3. In a press release on progress subsequent to the G-20 London Summit, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) included the following commitment to promoting adherence to international standards: 
“The FSB is developing a system of peer reviews of regulatory and prudential standards and of policies 
agreed in the FSB.”  Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Reports on Improving 
Financial Regulation (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/ 
pr_090925a.pdf.  See also FIN. STABILITY BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE 
LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925a.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS 
SINCE THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT IN IMPLEMENTING THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009) [hereinafter FSB, PROGRESS SINCE PITTSBURGH], available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_091107a.pdf?noframes=1. 
  The FSB is comprised of representatives from twenty-four countries, six international 
organizations, and six international standard setters, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the 
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America; the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank; the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).  Fin. Stability Bd., Links to FSB 
Members, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). 
  In connection with this project the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the FSB 
predecessor institution, the Financial Stability Forum, agreed from the outset to support G-20 
recommendations in a letter dated November 13, 2008.  Fin. Stability Forum & Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Joint Letter to the G-20 Ministers and Governors (Nov. 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_081113.pdf.  In August 2010, citing a proposal 
dated August 10, 2010, the Executive Board of the IMF explicitly accepted membership in the FSB.  See 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF MEMBERSHIP IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD ¶¶ 9, 17 (2010), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/081010.pdf; INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
EXECUTIVE BOARD, IMF MEMBERSHIP IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2010), available at 
http://www.if.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/081010a.pdf.  More recently, upon announcing publication of 
a report on the Intensity and Effectiveness of Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) 
Supervision, the FSB stated: 
While the [SIFI] recommendations are primarily aimed at making SIFIs less susceptible 
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require biennial peer reviews, coupled with IMF assessments, of at least 
the G-20 countries for “compliance” with existing key standards and 
codes for regulators and supervisors—that is, more aggressive 
enforcement through mutual evaluations, peer pressure, and oversight 
reviews of the effectiveness of micro-prudential supervisory and 
regulatory practices.4 
Undeniably, more alert and more stringent, enforcement of such 
global standards, as are currently in place, might have avoided some of 
the regulatory failures that led to the current crisis, described by many as 
the greatest since the Great Depression.  Undeniably, stronger 
enforcement of existing requirements is a laudable goal in and of itself.  
The question raised by this Article is, even so, can enforcement of 
existing global standards for capital markets as articulated by the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
particularly those related to cooperative information exchange,5 without 
to failure, there are also lessons for the supervision of financial institutions more 
generally.  The FSB has asked standard setters and national authorities to follow up on 
these recommendations as they incorporate them into supervisory core principles and 
national supervisory frameworks respectively.  For several key recommendations, 
standard setters and national authorities have been asked to report their progress to the 
FSB.  FSB thematic peer reviews and IMF/World Bank FSAP [Financial Stability 
Assessment Program] assessments will assess national implementation and ongoing 
conformity with these higher standards. 
Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Releases Report on Supervisory Intensity and 
Effectiveness 2 (Nov. 1, 2010) (The report is available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/r_101101.pdf).  This report does not comprehensively address non-banking, securities 
intermediaries. 
 4. FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 1 (2010) [hereinafter FSB FRAMEWORK], available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf.  Part of this document is republished 
in Annex I-C, infra.  Cf. JOHN PALMER & CAROLINE CERRUTI, IS THERE A NEED TO RETHINK THE 
SUPERVISORY PROCESS? (2009) (prepared for an international conference organized by the World Bank 
and Banco de Espana). 
 5. The FSB also focuses on non-cooperative jurisdictions, with the possible sanction of so-
called “name and shame” measures.  FSB, PROGRESS SINCE PITTSBURGH, supra note 3, at 10.  See FIN. 
STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARDS 20 (2010) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL 
ADHERENCE], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100310.pdf; see also 
G-20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf.  If there is any 
doubt of the power of “grey or black listing,” one need only observe the increasing level of high level 
political activity directed to avoiding being on any such list that occurs when jurisdictions are warned of 
potential listing in connection with insufficient procedures to combat money-laundering.  See, e.g., Colin 
Powell, Chairman, N.J. Fin. Servs. Comm’n, Address on Anti-Money Laundering (Nov. 21, 2003), 
http://www.jerseyfsc.org/the_commission/general_information/speeches/stepjersey.asp; see also FIN. 
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTERS (2000), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf; Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, 
FSF Reviews Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) Initiative (Apr. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_040405.pdf.  The FSB will particularly concern itself 
3
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more—however valuable—be expected to prevent or remedy a future 
credit and confidence crisis?  And, if not, what actions, such as (1) 
enhanced guidance on implementation, (2) addition of more quantitative 
measures of compliance, (3) expansion of the standards for cooperative 
information sharing, or (4) agreement on particular prophylactic 
systemic protections, would be necessary to achieve these goals? 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The IOSCO Standards 
Prior to June 2010, the securities (capital markets) standards or the 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Principles), 
contained three objectives, thirty principles and an annex on the related 
laws that are preconditions to robust securities regulation.6  These were 
explained both in an initial document containing the Principles7 and in a 
later-developed Assessment Methodology document relating to their 
implementation.8  At IOSCO’s Annual Meeting in Montreal in June 
2010, revisions to the Principles, but not the related texts, were adopted 
that acknowledge certain of the points made below.9  More reforms are 
ongoing, with further reporting of these expected in April at IOSCO’s 
with the review of those Principles listed in Annex I-C for each financial sector. 
 6. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION i-
iii (2008, originally published in 1998) [hereinafter IOSCO PRINCIPLES], available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD265.pdf; Annex I-A, infra.  As of the first quarter 
of 2011, the FSAP reports on standards and codes (ROSC) continue to be conducted using the 1998 (as 
reissued in 2008) Principles.  Where the term “Principle” is referred to in the text of this document, it 
refers to that Principle as constituted between 1998 and 2010.  As a whole these Principles are, referred 
to herein as the IOSCO Principles.  The new Principles adopted in 2010 are renumbered, so that the 
numbers that were previously used for certain Principles have been changed.  Principles from 2010 will 
be referred to as New Principles and the Principles as a whole will be referred to as 2010 Principles.  See 
infra note 9. 
 7. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6. 
 8. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2008, originally published in 2003) 
[hereinafter IOSCO METHODOLOGY], available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD266.pdf. 
 9. The updated 2010 version of the IOSCO Principles (hereinafter referred to as 2010 
Principles), contains 38 Principles.  The 2010 Principles effectively add nine new Principles in that 
former Principles 6 and 7 were consolidated.  INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND 
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PRINCIPLES], available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf; Annex I-B, infra.  These new Principles 
relate to hedge funds, credit rating agencies and other evaluators, the conflict prevention process, a 
process relative to systemic risk appropriate to the mandate of the regulatory authority, and a process to 
review the perimeter or scope of regulatory authority.  2010 PRINCIPLES, supra.  While there is currently 
no agreed text explaining, or methodology for implementing, the new Principles, discussions are 
ongoing within several committees of IOSCO. 
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2011 Annual Meeting in South Africa. 
The Principles were originally adopted in September 1998 as a policy 
response to the Asian financial crisis and became one of the standards 
and codes referred to when the financial stability assessment program 
for assessing jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks first began.10  In 
2003, after a painful multi-year joint drafting exercise, IOSCO also 
published an extensive Methodology for assessing implementation of the 
Principles11 in an attempt to make the assessments more consistent and 
to provide more guidance on what should be deemed to constitute 
compliance.  In 2004, an e-methodology version of the Methodology 
together with some additional instructions, links to relevant IOSCO 
reports, and a set of frequently asked questions were adopted and in 
2007 these were made public to non-members.12 
The Principles and the Methodology reflect consensus among all the 
national authorities representing widely different markets at different 
stages of market development that are members of IOSCO, an institution 
with over a hundred members from more than a hundred jurisdictions.13  
As of 2007, some seventy-five financial sector assessments for the 
securities sector had been conducted and evaluated by the IMF and the 
World Bank staff and experts in accordance with the IOSCO 
standards.14  In addition to updates, the IMF and World Bank are now in 
 10. The Financial Stability Forum originally endorsed twelve Key Standards and Codes.  Fin. 
Stability Bd., 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
cos/key_standards.htm (last visited July 24, 2010).  The FSB currently cites a broader compendium of 
standards and codes on its website.  Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Financial Regulation and 
Supervision, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_99/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2010); Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Institutional and Market Infrastructure, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_98/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010); Fin. Stability Bd., Subject Area – Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_cos_subject_area/tid_97/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010). 
 11. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8. 
 12. IOSCO, IOSCO E-Methodology Principles, https://www.iosco.org/webmeth_pub/index.cfm 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010); INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE XXIXTH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (2004), 
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0405iosco.pdf (IOSCO announcing the availability of an e-
methodology in 2004).  The actual methodology was not posted on the non-member portion of the 
IOSCO website, however, until 2007. 
 13. IOSCO, IOSCO Historical Background, https://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Sept. 4, 2010); IOSCO, Ordinary Members of IOSCO, 
https://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (listing 114 Ordinary 
Members). 
 14. See also the discussion by IMF staff relating to levels of implementation, which raises the 
issue of consistent ratings, especially where qualitative judgments on implementation are required.  Ana 
Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A Global 
Analysis 10, 48 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/259, 2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf.  IOSCO also conducts “assisted self-
5
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the process of completing assessments of those G-20 countries which 
have not yet been subject to a Financial Stability Assessment, including 
the United States and Indonesia (2009–2010) and China (2011) and 
beginning a round of more rigorous evaluations.  The assessments are 
performed by experienced assessors,15 including those nominated by 
IOSCO, who possess broad knowledge of multiple markets. 
The collaborative IOSCO process of standard development and 
elucidation is markedly different from that for development of the Basel 
core standards for banking supervision, which from the outset, until 
recently, were disseminated from the top down by the G-10 major 
jurisdictions and which contain certain quantitative measures of 
“compliance.”16  Historically, the canon of the IOSCO Principles, in 
recognition of the diversity among securities markets, has been that 
there is “often no single correct approach to a regulatory issue.”17  The 
Principles explicitly acknowledge that legislative “and regulatory 
structures vary between [and among] jurisdictions and reflect local 
market conditions and historical development.”18 
B. What Is Missing?  IOSCO Principles and Methodology Set a Sound 
Framework But Are Not Helpful on Certain Matters 
 Relevant to the Crisis 
The Principles describe a comprehensive framework for capital 
markets regulation that delineates the essential qualities and powers of a 
assessments,” which are effectively mutual evaluation exercises.  IOSCO, Self-Assessment for 
Securities Regulators: Instructions and Templates, https://www.iosco.org/webmeth_pub/ 
Instructions.cfm (last visited Sept. 4, 2010). 
 15. FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE, supra note 5, at 8. 
 16. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) is the standard setter for banking supervisors and author of the Basel Core Principles 
for Bank Supervision.  The jurisdictions which currently are members of the BCBS are Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.  About the Basel 
Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).  The present Chairman of the 
Committee is Mr. Nout Wellink, President of the Netherlands Bank.  Id.  The BCBS was twice 
expanded in 2009: on March 13 Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico and Russia were added and on 
June 10 Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey were added.  Press Release, Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel Committee (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm; Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Committee 
Broadens Its Membership (June 10, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.htm.  See also BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (2006), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf. 
 17. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 5. 
 18. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 3. 
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capital markets regulator;19 the elements of proper oversight of issuers, 
collective investments, intermediaries, and markets;20 and the 
components of an effective enforcement regime.21  As such, they are 
intended to permit the identification of regulatory gaps and deficiencies, 
to expose insufficiencies in relevant laws and applicable resources, and 
to illustrate what makes national regulators good citizens of the 
international community.  The Methodology provides an assessment 
process using Key Issues and Questions intended to result in a 
standardized form of rating as well as preambles and explanatory notes 
that provide further content to application of the Principles. 
The IOSCO-related assessment exercises, to which countries formerly 
voluntarily submitted, have materially improved the power and 
independence of regulators, identified and helped to close regulatory 
loopholes, and prompted a worldwide race to reform financial 
regulation, in particular the capacity to combat cross-border 
misconduct.22 
In many ways, despite what is known today about new fragilities in 
the financial system, the Principles and the related Methodology seem 
remarkably prescient.  However, by design and omission, the Principles 
have some significant lacunae, particularly in light of recent experience 
with respect to the products, transactions, and issues they cover.  
Moreover, the Principles were intended to continue to evolve, based 
upon regulatory experience and new information developed on markets 
and market misconduct, so as to remain capable of achieving their stated 
objectives, including protecting investors, maintaining fair, efficient, and 
transparent markets, and mitigating systemic risk.23 
 19. Id. at i (Principles 1–5, which are “Principles Relating to the Regulator”). 
 20. Id. at ii–iii (Principles 14–16 (“Principles for Issuers”), 17–20 (“Principles for Collective 
Investment Schemes”), 21–24 (“Principles for Market Intermediaries”), 25–30 (“Principles for the 
Secondary Market”)). 
 21. Id. at i–ii (Principles 8–10 (“Principles for Enforcement of Securities Regulation”), 11–13 
(“Principles for Cooperation in Regulation”)). 
 22. Carvajal & Elliott, supra note 14. 
 23. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 3; see also, e.g., id. at 1–2 (relating to the challenges of 
technology, globalization, cross-border conduct, interdependencies among products, intermediaries and 
regulators and the relationship of “high regulatory standards and effective international cooperation [to] 
reduce systemic risk”); id. at 3 (commenting on implementation that speaks of markets being “in a 
constant state of development” and that regulation must change “to facilitate and properly regulate [the] 
changing markets”); id. at 5–7 (discussing the inter-linkages among objectives, specifically noting that 
instability may result from events outside a jurisdiction or across several jurisdictions and the 
importance of insolvency legislation); id. at 8 (noting the importance of the regulatory environment and 
in particular the legal framework (including Bankruptcy or Insolvency law as referred to in Annex 3) or 
pre-conditions); id. at 9 (discussing the potential for inequities or gaps where a product or service 
exhibits characteristics associated with securities, banking and insurance); id. at 13 (describing SRO 
conflicts where an SRO handles both member and market regulation); id. at 21 (describing the issues 
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1. Apparent Gaps 
In light of recent events, there are significant gaps in the Principles as 
they existed in 1998, for which any remedies intended by the 2010 
Principles remain obscure.  By their terms, the Principles do not cover 
certain ground.  For example, although they purport to extend to 
derivatives markets, at least listed or regulated derivatives, the 
Principles’ text explicitly acknowledges that derivatives, which are 
quintessentially global, may require additional measures.24  The 
Principles do not cover private offers or define what a private offer of 
securities is.25  They also treat certain issues, such as governance, anti-
money laundering, and clearing and settlement, rather superficially, 
deferring to other codes or authorities and not elaborating much on the 
particular interests of securities regulators in these issues.26  They do not 
related to conglomerates); id. at 24 (addressing the importance of enforcement not just against fraud but 
of issuer obligations); id. at 25 (commenting on the reliability of financial information to informed 
decision making); id. at 36 (risks from off-balance sheet and unlicensed affiliates); id. at 31 (noting the 
difficulty of fair value asset valuation).  The foregoing recitation of high level references to regulatory 
issues (“principles-based concerns”) that remain startlingly current suggest areas where some 
expansions might be made to provide further guidance.  The original Principles were articulated under 
the guidance and leadership of the three IOSCO Chairs at a Chair Committee level, however, using high 
level staff sherpas.  Arguably any proposed enhancement of the Principles should receive the same level 
of engagement and consistency of attention at this juncture by the high level leaders of IOSCO.  This 
may be difficult when the responsiveness of existing regulators to many specific matters is under attack 
in several jurisdictions. 
 24. Much of the current crisis response is directed to derivatives, however.  As stated by the EU 
Commission: 
  The market for derivatives is global.  To ensure an ambitious and convergent 
international regulatory outcome, the proposals are in line with the objectives agreed at 
the G20 meeting of 25 September 2009.  The [European] Commission intends to further 
develop the technical details in cooperation with its G20 partners in order to ensure a 
coherent implementation of these policies across the globe and thus avoid regulatory 
arbitrage.  Such cooperation is particularly important with the US, which is also in the 
process of designing a new approach to derivatives markets. 
Press Release, European Comm’n, Financial Services: Commission Sets Out Future Actions to 
Strengthen the Safety of Derivatives Markets (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1546&format=HTML&language=EN.  
But see EU Hints of Different Approach to U.S. on Banks, MONEYNEWS.COM, Feb. 17, 2010, 
http://moneynews.com/InvestingAnalysis/EU-Approach-U-S--Banks/2010/02/17/id/350139 
(“According to a briefing note given to finance ministers and obtained by The Associated Press, 
European officials ‘expressed their concern that the application of the Volcker rule in the EU may not be 
consistent with the current principles of the internal market and universal banking.’”).  The Dodd–Frank 
legislation adopted in 2010 does include language drawn from the Volcker proposal, but is less 
restrictive than originally projected.  See, e.g., Editorial, Dodd–Frank Bill’s Volcker Rule a Win for Big 
Banks, ATLANTIC, June 25, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/dodd-frank-
bills-volcker-rule-a-win-for-big-banks/58747/. 
 25. See IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at ii (Principles 14–16); IOSCO METHODOLOGY, 
supra note 8, at 70–71, 76–77, 82–83 (Explanatory Notes for Principles 14–16). 
 26. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 8, 16, 48 (deferring to the Organization of Economic 
8
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provide definitive measures for evaluating prudential requirements; and, 
although new work has been done on cross-border cooperation,27 nor do 
the Principles themselves appear to provide much guidance on the use of 
information sharing and cooperative measures for pre-empting and 
managing financial disruption and crisis as opposed to after-the-fact 
enforcement efforts. 
a. The Prudential Gap 
Only four of the original Principles—22, 24, 29, and 30—are directly 
related to the financial integrity of markets and intermediaries and to the 
handling of market disruptions and firm failures from the perspective of 
the regulator.  For example, Principle 23 speaks to internal controls of 
authorized intermediaries, largely looking at the responsibilities of 
intermediary management and less extensively at the role of the 
regulator.  Importantly, the IOSCO Principles do not prescribe a capital 
or an accounting methodology other than by a caution to address all 
relevant risks28 and to apply consistent and high level standards.29  
Additionally, the Principles do not take a position on the desirability of 
compensation arrangements (or safety nets) to cover customer funds in 
the event of an intermediary default or on other measures intended to 
prevent financial contagion or losses of confidence.30  The Principles 
and Methodology also do not provide much detail on how best to 
conduct ongoing surveillance of markets to identify risk factors relevant 
to systemic financial disruptions as opposed to identifying misconduct 
such as miss-selling, manipulation, and insider trading.  Guidance on 
how to measure regulatory performance is also quite limited.31 
Thus, the pre-2010 Principles at the basis of the IOSCO assessment of 
standards and codes for capital markets arguably do not 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) as the governance standard setter, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) as the AML/anti-terrorism financing, standard setter, and the work of the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and IOSCO on clearing and settlement); IOSCO 
METHODOLOGY, supra note 8.  A consultation on refining the clearing and settlement standards 
(principles for financial markets infrastructures—FMIs) commenced March 10, 2011. 
 27. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES REGARDING 
CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISORY COOPERATION (2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/ 
publicdocumentsIOSCOPD322.pdf. 
 28. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 104–05 (emphasis on Principle 22, Key Issue 3, and 
Key Questions 2 and 3). 
 29. Id. at 82–83 (Principle 16, Explanatory Note). 
 30. Id. at 128 (Principle 24, stating that such matter should be taken into consideration by 
assessors). 
 31. See Carvajal & Elliott, supra note 14, at 10 (discussing implementation and raising the issue 
of consistent ratings, especially where qualitative judgments on implementation are required). 
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comprehensively address the identification, measurement, and 
mitigation of prudential risks and other potentially systemic 
vulnerabilities relevant to crisis prevention and crisis management, 
which were at the core of the global community’s current financial 
woes.  For example: 
 
 The amount and quality of capital; 
 The ratio of short to long term financing; 
 The appropriate level of regulatory scrutiny of the financial 
risk consequences of particular product structures or trading 
practices; 
 The nature of liquidity and means for achieving liquidity in 
compromised markets; 
 The use of leverage and collateral; 
 The mechanisms whereby financial contagion is transmitted 
from the banking to the securities sector and vice versa or 
could spread from outside the regulated sector;32 and 
 The measurement of risk. 
 
 In this regard, the IOSCO Principles could be viewed as lacking 
agreed views on certain elements of the regulatory framework, which 
could be critical to the resolution and prevention of future crises. 
To some, the current crisis was a typical banking crisis deriving 
largely from a business model that borrows short, lends long, and relies 
on liquidity arrangements not segregation of client assets and money to 
return customer/depositor money.  For them, the securities-related issues 
are largely secondary.  Nonetheless, if one is to market enforcement of 
the securities core principles as a remedy for crisis, then the content of 
the Principles and the related Methodology for applying them should be 
reviewed with that objective in mind. 
b. The “Outside the Perimeter”33 Gap 
Similarly, the scope of the Principles is limited.  Many products and 
transactions are intentionally excluded, among them foreign currency, 
certain commodities, and bullion34 as beyond the current jurisdiction of 
securities regulators or not subject to regulation under existing 
 32. Consider, for example, the cash commodity markets or unregulated, so-called “shadow-
banking,” markets. 
 33. 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4 (New Principle 7 states that “[t]he Regulator should have 
or contribute to a process to review the perimeter of regulation regularly.”). 
 34. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 5. 
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legislation although potentially within the mandate of such regulators.  
The Principles do not treat the particular issues of over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, certain wholesale transactions, opaque non-regulated 
markets, or so-called hedge funds.35  Nor do they even touch upon the 
potential risks and tribulations related to securitization.  Further, while 
they do give assessors the capacity to make some judgments as to certain 
issues related to private offers, any analysis of when information 
asymmetry, for example, can disrupt markets as well as be a conduct of 
business36 issue is mostly absent.  Nor has much related work been done 
on risk migration or the various synergies for good or ill among various 
types of markets, including regulated and unregulated markets. 
c. The Information-Sharing Gap 
Principles 11–13 are related to information sharing and cooperation.  
Significant strides have been made in advancing the extent to which 
regulators assist each other (1) to prevent fraudsters from hiding beyond 
national borders and (2) to address insider trading and market abuse that 
can originate from market participants located outside the jurisdiction of 
the market’s establishment or can migrate from the cash to the 
derivatives market and vice versa.  With the technology revolution and 
growth of cross-border business, this type of assistance is increasingly 
essential.37  Steps are now being taken to extend the international 
community’s expectation with respect to a regulator’s ability to engage 
 35. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT FOR HEDGE FUNDS: A SURVEY AND COMPARISON 3 (2006), available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD226.pdf (exploring whether IOSCO should take a 
more active role in regulating hedge funds).  The 2010 Principles do address hedge funds.  2010 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 10 (New Principle 28 states that “[r]egulation should ensure that hedge 
funds and/or hedge funds managers/advisers are subject to appropriate oversight.”). 
 36. “Conduct of business” includes such considerations as fair and equitable treatment of clients 
and timely delivery of material disclosures. 
 37. In 2007, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) reported that it had 150,000 screens located 
outside the U.S., and brokers in listed-derivatives typically operate in multiple jurisdictions.  In the U.S., 
145 non-US firms operate in the U.S. through Part 30 exemptions.  See, e.g., Andrea M. Corcoran, 
Regulating Futures Markets, the Evolving Federalist Model, FUTURES INDUSTRY ASS’N MAG., 
May/June 2007, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazinesphome.asp?a=1188; see also 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, List of Foreign Part 30 Exemptions, 
http://services.cftc.gov/sirt/ sirt.aspx?Topic=ForeignPart30Exemptions (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).  The 
National Futures Association (NFA), the only CFTC-registered futures association, processes 
applications and maintains information on Part 30-qualified firms—though these processes are currently 
under review due to ongoing financial reform.  While no aggregate number is on the public website, 
NFA reported when queried that 145 firms make use of this exemption which permits reliance for some 
purposes on foreign regulators.  See 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (2010); Andrea M. Corcoran, Regulators: 
Leadership and Reaction, in 10 ELECTRONIC EXCHANGES: THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION FROM PITS 
TO BITS 227 (Michael Gorham & Nidhi Singh eds., 2009). 
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in information sharing with views on its more substantive power to 
freeze assets and to prevent the sequestration of ill-gotten gains behind 
non-cooperative jurisdictional screens.38 
But information shared for enforcement purposes, usually after the 
fact of a violation or market disturbance, is not targeted to pre-empting 
or remediating crises.  While a common bond among regulators, 
encouraged by the disciplined process articulated by IOSCO to become 
a signatory of the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of 
Information (IOSCO MMOU),39 to share enforcement information has 
markedly reduced the ability to hide the fruits of fraud or market abuse 
behind borders, enforcement sharing will not necessarily prevent 
systemic risks or other vulnerabilities related to financial failures.  
Indeed, at least temporary “forbearance” of enforcement or intervention 
(though a disfavored regulatory methodology) is often the most 
pragmatic response to preventing potential contagion until the regulator 
or supervisor has followed any missing funds and staunched the 
bleeding. 
 International enforcement cooperation as described in the 
Principles—even under the IOSCO gold standard—then may not be a 
solution to financial crisis.  New norms of cooperation other than after-
the-fact sharing are now not merely desirable but critical, and more 
guidance is necessary.  In recognition, in May of 2010, IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee (of basically the G-20 jurisdictions) adopted new 
Principles for sharing information for cross-border supervisory purposes, 
including a related memorandum of understanding or MOU template.40  
The IOSCO Principles, however, extend to all IOSCO jurisdictions.  To 
address the need for preventive information sharing, one can expect 
 38. TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE IOSCO TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE (2007) (“In addressing cross-border fraud, IOSCO has recognised (in its 7 June 2006 
Resolution on Cross-border Cooperation to Freeze Assets Derived from Securities and Derivatives 
Violations) that the effective enforcement of securities laws and regulations would increase if national 
regulators can provide cross-border assistance to a regulator in another jurisdiction in freezing assets 
relating to securities violations.  At this time, not all IOSCO jurisdictions have sufficient powers to 
freeze assets which have derived from fraudulent activities.  Therefore, IOSCO has encouraged its 
members to examine the legal framework under which they operate and strive to develop mechanisms 
by which within their jurisdiction these assets could be frozen.”). 
 39. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002) 
[hereinafter IOSCO MMOU], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf.  
IOSCO requires applicants to become signatories to pass a screening process and has a monitoring 
committee that monitors ongoing compliance.  See IOSCO, List of Signatories, 
www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (current signature 
list). 
 40. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 27. 
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increasing interest in, and calls for, the IOSCO-wide Principles to 
require so-called “second-generation” (or on-going) information sharing 
understandings designed (1) to detect and deter particular risks 
proactively and (2) to better measure risks across borders. 
 Some jurisdictions have already implemented such arrangements.41  
For example, the listed derivatives markets’ regulators have been leaders 
in developing, through a number of international meetings in the 1990’s, 
some consensus on the types of information that should be shared to 
assure appropriate forward-thinking surveillance of markets for 
prudential failures as well as market abuses.  These separate initiatives 
have in the past led to detailed work within IOSCO, although these 
initiatives are not used in standards assessments.42  The broader 
 41. As an example, see the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) arrangements 
with the U.K. Financial Services Authority (UK FSA).  U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Memoranda of Understanding, http://www.cftc.gov/International/MemorandaofUnderstanding/ 
index.htm (last visited July 31, 2010) (noting memorandum of understanding between the CFTC and the 
UK FSA);  see also Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission and the U.K. Financial Services Authority Sign an MOU to Address Cross-Border 
Market Surveillance Concerns (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
PressReleases/pr5259-06.html (commenting on surveillance sharing).  The UK FSA will cede prudential 
oversight and take on an enhanced oversight of conduct role commencing in 2011 through 2012.  These 
changes may result in concomitant changes in existing information sharing arrangements.  Such 
adjustments were made previously when the Financial Services Authority succeeded the Securities 
Investment Board, one of its predecessor agencies. 
 42. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, THE APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO 
COMMUNIQUÉ TO EXCHANGE-TRADED FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS (1998) [hereinafter 
APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD85.pdf.  That report states: 
  In October 1997, regulatory authorities from 16 jurisdictions responsible for 
supervising commodity futures markets participated in the Tokyo Commodity Futures 
Markets Regulators’ Conference in Tokyo, Japan . . . .  At the end of the meeting the 
regulators issued the Tokyo Communiqué on Supervision of Commodity Futures Markets 
which, among other things, endorsed two guidance papers relating to exchange-traded 
derivatives: (1) Guidance on Standards of Best Practice for the Design and/or Review of 
Commodity Contracts (‘Design Guidance’); and (2) Guidance on Components of Market 
Surveillance and Information Sharing (‘Surveillance Guidance’) (collectively ‘the Tokyo 
Guidances’). 
APPLICATION OF THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ, supra, at 2. 
  For example, the Tokyo Communiqué specifically states: 
[I]n view of the fact that information is a critical tool for maintaining fair and orderly 
markets and ensuring market integrity in non-financial physical delivery markets with 
finite supply, . . . market authorities should seek the removal of domestic legal or other 
barriers to ensure, consistent with the regulatory framework of each jurisdiction, access 
by market authorities to information that permits them to detect and to deter abusive 
practices and disorderly conditions in the markets, including access to information that 
permits them to identify concentrations of positions and the overall composition of the 
market. 
TOKYO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS REGULATORS’ CONFERENCE (THE TOKYO COMMUNIQUÉ) 9 
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relevance of this work is not spelled out in the existing Assessment 
Methodology nor is it part of the IOSCO vetting process related to 
information sharing.  Among other things, these initiatives addressed 
issues relative to the design of derivative contracts to assure that they 
have economic as well as speculative value and real-time ways to assess 
ongoing risks in markets where mutualization of risk through central 
counterparties is the typical means of assuring performance and settling 
accounts.  These initiatives, which address systemic concerns, could be 
revisited in the context of equity and over-the-counter markets now in 
the context of deepening the usefulness of the IOSCO Principles. 
2. Proactive Information Sharing, While Helpful, May Not Be Enough 
No matter how good the information sharing regime is, there remains 
suspicion among regulators as a group that when there is a problem that 
threatens the health of a national institution, the national regulator 
addresses its own exposures first before it calls its regulatory 
counterparts.43  Politicians do not receive many plaudits for saving their 
neighbors’ citizens from loss, although in light of the increasing 
integration of the financial community, perhaps they should. 
Consequently, even though enhanced cooperation and proactive 
information sharing is desirable, and may provide a better understanding 
of interconnected risks and the size of market problems or the 
deficiencies in national data, such information sharing may not, in and 
of itself, be enough to address market failures where insufficient funds 
to satisfy outstanding claims are at stake. 
If : 
 there is no assurance that any domestic insolvency regime will 
provide equivalent protection to all similarly situated market 
participants (e.g., with the same class of claim); 
 there is an insufficiency of funds to cover all claims; 
 an early actor can adversely affect a fair allocation of losses; 
(1997), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/commerce/intl/tkyc.pdf.  See also TECHNICAL COMM. 
OF IOSCO, GUIDANCE ON INFORMATION SHARING (1997) [hereinafter TECH. COMM., GUIDANCE], 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD86.pdf. 
 43. Anecdotally, in the case of the Societé Gènèrale rogue trader, M. Kerviel, some jurisdictions 
claimed that the French authorities addressed any potential domestic exposures without informing their 
international regulatory confreres until the problem was past.  In the case of the Barings collapse, 
anecdotally, all futures positions at the then London Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) were 
transferred before the BOE took up the phone to call American regulatory authorities.  Cf. Andrea M. 
Corcoran, Markets’ Self-Assessment and Improvement of Default Strategies after the Collapse of 
Barings, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265 (1996).  See also Will Acworth, The Lessons of Lehman, 
Reassessing Customer Protections, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Jan.–Feb. 2009, available at 
http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazine-home.asp?a=1297. 
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or 
 the ability to prevent contagion by moving funds with 
positions does not exist; 
then: all the enforcement of existing standards, cooperation, and 
information sharing in the world will not remedy the difficulty. 
3. The Moving Target 
The IOSCO Principles were originally written in 1998.  The 
Methodology was originally published in 2003.  To date, the means of 
updating these has been to provide footnotes relating to IOSCO reports 
that give more content to the high level Principles and that can be 
consulted by assessors.44  Not all of these reports, however, have been 
adopted by the full IOSCO.  Further, to date, there has been no specific 
agreement on when needed guidance ought to be explicitly included in 
the Principles or the Methodology.  Nor is there any guidance on how to 
use the existing footnotes.  The new Principles announced in 2010 have 
yet to be explicated, though work is ongoing, and do not cover all of the 
issues identified here. 
4. Capital Markets Issues and the G-20 
 In a February 2009 press release, after the G-20’s Washington 
Summit, IOSCO’s Secretary General indicated that IOSCO recognized 
the need to update its program as part of its policy response to the crisis.  
He relates how IOSCO was an active participant in identifying new 
areas of concentration, stating: “In recognition of its role in the 
development of international regulatory standards, IOSCO has also been 
invited to participate in two of the G-20 Working Groups—Enhancing 
Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency; and Financial 
Market Integrity and International Cooperation.”45  He noted that 
IOSCO itself had convened three specialist Task Forces to look at: short 
 44. IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 2 (“Many of the topics addressed in this document are 
already the subject of IOSCO reports or Resolutions.  The reports published by IOSCO and the 
Resolutions adopted by its membership are also a valuable source of information on the principles that 
underlie effective securities regulation and the tools and techniques necessary to give effect to those 
principles.  This document draws upon those reports as a primary source.  IOSCO’s reports generally 
provide a more detailed treatment of the particular topic.  Reference is made to those reports and 
resolutions in the notes to this document and they should be consulted when considering particular 
topics.  Full copies of the text of reports and resolutions can be obtained from the IOSCO Secretariat.”).  
In 2003 and most recently in 2008 the notes referring to other reports in the Principles and the 
Assessment Methodology were updated. 
 45. Greg Tanzer, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Increased Co-operation is Essential: IOSCO’s 
Response to the G-20 Challenge to Financial Regulators, HEDGE FUND JOURNAL, Feb. 2009. 
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selling; unregulated entities, and unregulated markets and products.46  
He concluded that, IOSCO believed that: its “participation in [the G-20] 
Working Groups will ensure that the views of securities regulators are 
present at the policy formulation stage within the G-20.”47  In light of 
the complications of securitization and various securities markets 
products, it is not only beneficial but vital for IOSCO to be a full 
participant in the ongoing standards dialogue. 
However, there is no corresponding statement yet as to how this work 
is projected to be integrated in the existing Methodology. 
5. Altering the Canon of Country Specificity 
Placing increased reliance on the effectiveness of the execution of the 
Principles may put pressure on the former canon within the IOSCO 
community that some differences in regulatory tools, techniques, and the 
execution of regulatory mandates may be necessary because of 
differences in the nature of the assessed markets’ level of development 
and in the applicable legal system (common law, civil, etc.).  No real 
attention beyond the Methodology has been given to how much 
flexibility can be tolerated in interpreting the Principles if they are to 
result in public ratings that are comparable across jurisdictions or in 
equivalent conditions of cross-border competition. 
IOSCO’s rating system sets a compliance bar that jurisdictions must 
meet.  Moving to a stronger view, as has been done with the IOSCO 
MMOU, on where consistency is essential will require strength of will 
and a better appreciation of precisely where equivalence or convergence 
as opposed to harmonization is desired.  Determining under which 
circumstances jurisdictional differences in approach are not acceptable 
may be quite difficult especially where discretion and flexibility remain 
necessary to meet market evolutions and allocations of resources. 
Nonetheless, as outlined in another context, in order for standards to 
work properly and not be gamed or permit unfair competition related to 
the costs of capital, some measures may need to be common or 
commonly understood and interpreted, even if for others, exemptions, 
 46. Id.  See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATION OF 
SHORT SELLING (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD292.pdf; 
TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT (2009), available 
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf; TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. 
OF SEC. COMM’NS, UNREGULATED FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PRODUCTS (2009), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD308.pdf. 
 47. Tanzer, supra note 45. 
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substituted compliance, information sharing, and additional transparency 
or disclosure48 may suffice.  For example, international coordination and 
cooperation intended to address fair and equitable sharing of losses or 
treatment of failing institutions undertaking cross-border business 
ultimately may require more convergence to achieve their objectives 
than those of better disclosure. 
Common understandings of the numbers produced by capital 
requirements and accounting also may require more prescription than 
discretion.49  If capital models and measures are idiosyncratic or 
disbelieved by the industry or the public, if the data on which they are 
based is incomplete or broadly different, or if the data that they produce 
is suspect, these seeming flaws could engender inter-jurisdictional 
mistrust.  In turn mistrust can adversely affect inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation and resolution arrangements as well as mutual clearing 
commitments or insurance regimes.  Quantitative cross-border 
misunderstandings can result in distrust of the efficacy of information 
sharing as a mechanism for managing financial or market disruptions 
and can prevent or delay regulatory expectations concerning the 
practicability of work out or rescue arrangements, such as the transfer of 
accounts from failing to solvent institutions.  Lack of common 
understandings can also call into question the veracity of statements of 
financial condition50 upon which investment, disinvestment, and 
 48. Consider the very interesting common comment responding to the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) call for evidence submitted by the EU–US Coalition, including among 
others the Futures and Options Association (FOA), the Futures Industry Association (FIA) and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).  Response by the EU–US Coalition on 
Financial Regulation to the CESR Call for Evidence on Mutual Recognition of Non-EU Jurisdictions 
(Sept. 2009) [hereinafter Response], available at http://europe.sifma.org/docs/CommentLetters/ 
20090916FOA,SIFMA,LIBA,ABASA,BAFT,BBA,FIA,ICMA,IIAC,ISDA,SBA,EBFResponsetoCESR
CEonMutualRecognition.pdf.  CESR, since January 1, 2011 has been superseded by the European 
Securities Market Authority (ESMA), an authority of the EU.  Even though “politics” could take 
mutuality discussions off the table for the time being, the discussion in this Article regarding different 
means of cooperation along a continuum from increased transparency of the rules and requirements to 
complete equivalence or standardization should prompt at least an exercise in mapping whether there is 
a difference in how different Principles should be approached. 
 49. Even before the Lehman Repo 105 use of derivatives to change the look of their financial 
condition across a reporting period, such “window dressing,” or “false reporting,” as the case may be 
was observed in other contexts and jurisdictions.  See Andrew Clark, Lehman Brothers: Repo 105 and 
Other Accounting Tricks, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
business/2010/mar/12/lehman-brothers-repo-105-enron (discussing how other companies have used 
techniques similar to those used by Lehman Brothers). 
 50. See, e.g., Daniel Gros, Transparency on Banks’ Balance Sheets?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN 
POL’Y STUDIES, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/transparency-banks-balance-
sheets; Daniel Gros & Cinzia Alcidi, What Lessons from the 1930’s?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y 
STUDIES, Mar. 7, 2009, available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/what-lessons-1930s; Felix Roth, Who Can 
be Trusted After the Financial Crisis?, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y STUDIES, Nov. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/who-can-be-trusted-after-financial-crisis; see also 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra 
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resolution as well as other regulatory decisions are based. 
The most disciplined treatment of the common enforcement of 
standards at the “granular” level by a peer review process is the current 
process for accession to the IOSCO MMOU.  The prescribed internal 
procedure includes vetting by a screening committee, an application 
comment process, an appeal from refusals, and an ongoing group 
procedure for monitoring continuing compliance.51  As of 2010, IOSCO 
requires all Member jurisdictions to either become a full signatory of the 
MMOU (e.g., an adherent listed in Annex A) or to commit to meet its 
terms by seeking necessary legislative change (that is, an adherent listed 
in Annex B).  All members must accede to Annex A by 2013.52  The 
admirable process applied to MMOU screenings could be emulated in 
determining how best to impose more robust requirements on 
compliance with other core Principles.  The MMOU enlists every 
IOSCO member in the community of regulators devoted to clean 
markets and fair treatment of customers to meet its stringent criteria.53 
III. THE WAY FORWARD: SUBSTANCE 
A. More or Enhanced Guidance on Applying the Principles 
In light of the high level nature of the Principles themselves and the 
projected expanded role for their enforcement, some gaps or ambiguities 
could potentially be remedied and newly pertinent issues could be 
addressed, through amendment of the Assessment Methodology or the 
production of additional guidance?54  For example, IOSCO could 
note 9 (principles 19 to 23 on auditing, credit rating agencies and evaluators); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG 
SHORT (2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010). 
 51. Press Release, Int’t Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Completes Framework to Fight Cross-
Border Market Abuse (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/ 
IOSCONEWS176.pdf; Press Release, Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, IOSCO Strengthens International 
Cooperation to Fight Illegal Securities and Derivatives Activities (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20031016/01.pdf. 
 52. As of July 31, 2010, there were seventy-one signatories to the IOSCO Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding.  See IOSCO, IOSCO Library Section, www.iosco.org/library/ 
index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).  For the Memorandum of Understanding, see 
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: CONCERNING 
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf. 
 53. The IOSCO MMOU requirement to commit to delivery of enforcement assistance to other 
member signatories is subject only to certain national public policy concerns.  Information should be 
shared without the need for the violation for which the requesting authority seeks information to breach 
the requested authority’s laws.  See, e.g., IOSCO MMOU, supra note 39, § 7(c). 
 54. This does not appear that likely at the moment as the assessment exercise with heightened 
focus on compliance with the existing standards has already commenced and there will be a high level 
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consider: 
 covering newly perceived risks, exposures, gaps, and a spectrum of 
reasonable regulatory responses within existing or new explanatory 
notes; 
 adding separate guidance to assessors on systemic vulnerabilities 
and risk factors that should be covered by securities regulators 
under each Principle as relevant; 
 providing more specific guidance on implementation—such as what 
types of evidence to ask for, or measurement activities to undertake 
to assess the adequacy of capital requirements or the robustness of 
ongoing supervision of regulated entities; 
 developing specific quantitative and qualitative tests for capital or 
tests of performance for accounting principles; 
 providing examples, taken from assessors or participating 
jurisdictions, of specific fact situations where evaluation is 
particularly complex, such as independence, resourcing, 
accountability, the scope and coverage of supervisory activities, and 
how these relate to crisis management and resolution; 
 providing examples of how financial malfeasance and improper 
disclosure can affect not only customer protection but also firm 
financial integrity and ultimately economic stability; 
 adding enhancements related to preconditions, the components of 
the essential legal framework or environment essential to assuring 
the reliability of the performance of the standards (previously 
reputedly rejected by the IOSCO Implementation Task Force (ITF), 
the group drafting the Methodology, as too controversial at the 
national level because of limitations on the scope of regulatory 
authority in these areas); 
 adding guidance on the nature of accountability firms and their 
management and directors should have for compliance; and 
 taking comments from the IOSCO membership and the public as to 
what enhancements would have improved their jurisdictions’ crisis 
experiences or how their regulatory experience has affected policy 
development. 
B. Making Cooperation More Effective 
As a matter of substance, post-crisis, all existing cooperative 
mechanisms developed by national regulators to address a crisis that 
infects institutions and systems beyond its national borders could be 
under scrutiny to determine if they are sufficiently broad and targeted 
of political interest in the comparability of the assessments in view of the expectations for these, though 
new guidance on the revised principles is likely to be issued for consultation in April 2011.  See also 
Carvajal and Elliott, supra at note 14. 
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and the Principles (perhaps the new systemic Principle)55 should 
encourage this process.  These include: 
 transparency: do current transparency requirements permit 
sufficiently timely means to record, aggregate, and manage 
cross-border and domestic exposures; are all exposures 
included; and are the rules of the game in the event of distress 
situations equivalent between insiders and outsiders and 
known in advance to the players; 
 information sharing: do memoranda of understanding, 
colleges of regulators, dialogues, and exchange of specified 
information among regulators to supervise institutions 
exposed to and in multiple jurisdictions provide sufficiently 
timely and useful access to the information necessary to 
deliver on the comprehensive supervision promise; are they 
effective in practice in deterring as well as sanctioning 
conduct; and 
 reliance on due diligence and oversight processes of the 
licensing jurisdiction: do vetting regimes and sharing of 
relevant capital measures and compliance provide sufficient 
coverage to avoid financial pandemics, credit gridlock, and 
serial malfeasors, or do national jurisdictions need in-country 
financial support for the obligations the regulator incurs to 
support depositors and to oversee proper regulatory 
compliance. 
Is now not a time for IOSCO also to further address the following 
questions? 
 Why, when, and how can one regulator rely on another 
regulator or risk assessment provider? 
 How can we achieve international consistency of national 
laws where consistency is important to systemic safety? 
 How can we achieve international consistency of national 
laws where national individuality and accountability remain 
important to adequate oversight, customer protection, and 
education? 
 Having spotted the issue of interconnectedness, how can we 
better equip national regulators to identify and to address 
controlling connection risks while still serving their domestic 
customers? 
 In that banking and capital markets are risk-connected, other 
 55. 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4 (New Principle 6 states that “[t]he Regulator should have 
or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.”). 
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than merely indicating that where banking and securities 
authorities oversee the same entity securities regulators must 
have a mechanism for exchanging relevant information with 
banking supervisors on the supervision of that entity,56 how 
can we set up practical means for more broadly cooperating 
across sectors?57 
 Having produced specific guidance on the elements of 
information sharing for surveillance in some areas, how can 
we draw heightened attention to or revise the IOSCO 
Information Sharing Guidance, the Boca Declaration, or other 
such second generation arrangements to address market 
evolution?58 
 56. IOSCO METHODOLOGY, supra note 8, at 11–12 (discussing Principle 1). 
 57. In this respect, note the various proposals to avoid pro-cyclicality that call for reserving 
capital in good times and disbursing it in bad.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 58. See TOKYO COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS REGULATORS’ CONFERENCE (THE TOKYO 
COMMUNIQUÉ) (1997), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/commerce/intl/tkyc.pdf; Fin. Stability 
Bd., Guidance on Information Sharing, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/cos_980301b.htm 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2010); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Declaration on Cooperation and 
Supervision of International Futures Markets and Clearing Organisations (Boca Declaration) (1998), 
http://www.cftc.gov/International/InternationalInitiatives/oia_bocadec0398.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010) [hereinafter Boca Declaration]; see also TECH COMM., GUIDANCE, supra note 42.  The following 
types of information are cited by the Boca Declaration: 
1.8.  An Authority may make a Request if, within the ordinary course of its existing 
supervisory responsibilities, it becomes aware that any of the following events has 
occurred with respect to a Member of a Party: 
A. A large decrease in Owner’s Equity in any six month period. 
B. A Member’s cumulative net Variation Payments over ten consecutive business 
days for proprietary and non-customer positions which are unusually large in 
relation to the Member’s Owner’s Equity. 
C. A Member’s cumulative net Variation Payments over six consecutive months 
for proprietary and non-customer positions are unusually large in relation to the 
Member’s Owner’s Equity. 
D. A Member’s net Variation Payments for customer positions for one business 
day which are of unusually large size in relation to the Member’s Owner’s Equity. 
E. Total positions in a contract registered in a Member’s name, which represent at 
least 50% of the total long or short positions in that contract, the Open Interest of 
which is greater than 25,000 but less than 100,000. 
F. Total positions in a contract registered in a Member’s name which represent at 
least 25% of the total long or short positions in that contract, the Open Interest of 
which exceeds 100,000. 
G. A Member, Affiliate or a firm or other person with a substantial commercial 
relationship to the Member experiences an event that is not listed but in the 
opinion of an Authority is of a similar magnitude, and the Authority determines 
that it has reasonable grounds to seek information in accordance with Article 3 of 
this Declaration. 
1.9.  In addition, an Authority may make a Request if: (A) there are unusually large price 
movements in a market under its jurisdiction and/or unusual price relationships in related 
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C. Identifying Where More Guidance, Information Sharing, and 
Cooperation Are Not Enough 
Placing increased reliance on these standards as mechanisms of crisis 
prevention materially raises the stakes on the specific manner in which 
the standards are met by each national authority and on how 
implementation by each IOSCO member is rated.  Such reliance 
challenges the expectation that observance by IOSCO member 
jurisdictions of the standards as written can help protect against financial 
or market disruptions in ways that: (1) promote rather than discourage 
open markets; (2) limit unnecessary barriers to cross-border transacting; 
and (3) favor consistent, fair interpretation of rules for global as well as 
national stakeholders.  Failure to make the Principles work more 
effectively to deliver financial stability and safety of customer funds 
from non-trading related failures could compromise these other 
beneficial goals and further atomize rather than draw together the 
regulatory community.59 
To the extent it is inherent for national jurisdictions to save 
themselves before saving others the incentives behind such conduct 
should be recognized.  Additionally, there should be discussion of the 
need for automatic or prophylactic ways to deal with those risks unlikely 
to be mitigated by information sharing and cooperation.  Ultimately, if 
solutions to financial crises are to cross jurisdictional boundaries 
effectively, more prescriptive commonalities, such as common 
approaches to defaults, may need to be sought. 
These could include seeking broader understanding on: 
 margin or leverage limits; 
 position or exposure limits; 
 use of collateral; 
 appropriate and inappropriate ring-fencing; 
markets, or (B) it has a reasonable basis to believe that a Member, also subject to the 
jurisdiction of another Authority, or such Member’s customer or counterparty, may be 
attempting to accumulate an unusually large position which may have a substantial 
impact on the price of a contract or may be engaging in abusive activity. 
Boca Declaration, supra. 
 59. For example, John Kay refers to the projected tax-payer referendum in Iceland on March 6.  
Icelandic banks had a branch and a subsidiary in the U.K.  These banks aggressively raised deposits 
from U.K. retail investors.  Kay states: “The only satisfactory means of dealing with these problems 
requires that banks match their deposits with safe assets ring-fenced within the jurisdiction in which the 
deposits are collected.  The proposition that better regulation in all 27 member states will in [the] future 
prevent cross-border failures of retail banks is risible.”  John Kay, Shameful Bullying Should Find Its 
Nemesis in Iceland, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
e69c686a-20e4-11df-b920-00144feab49a.html.  The Icelandic public ultimately voted not to take 
responsibility for the losses to U.K. investors held by the branch; the U.K. filled the gap. 
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 when insolvency60 should be declared; 
 early warnings; 
 automatic expansions of collateral upon pre-set moves in the 
market; 
 circuit breakers; and 
 firm structure and the business model, etc. 
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: PROCESS 
A. Measuring the Principles Against the Crisis 
So assuming that to remain credible some level of enhancement 
remains essential, how might IOSCO take the Principles to the next 
step? 
Preliminarily, a gap analysis should be performed to measure the 
Principles against the crisis.  What Principles were implicated?  How did 
the Principles fare in addressing these?  Such an analysis might expose, 
for example, that: 
 National authorities trying to contain the contagion found that 
not rescuing a regulated intermediary awarded a government 
license to hold customer funds, absent mechanisms to keep 
solvent customer’s deposits whole and to wind down, in an 
orderly manner, the intermediary where such deposits were 
held was not a realistic option.  Why?  Such action 
destabilized confidence in regulated entities more generally 
and precipitated runs on deposits and redemptions of 
collective investment fund interests.61  Panicked monetizing 
 60. Cf. Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43 INT’L 
LAW 1189 (2009). 
 61. Rarely in the midst of a crisis is letting depositors bear losses an attractive option or a 
desirable policy outcome.  For examples, review the following: (1) Although Sweden had no deposit 
insurance program, it guaranteed the obligations of all banks, including deposits in 1992 in the midst of 
its banking crisis.  Peter Englund, The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences, 15 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 80, 91–92 (1999), available at http://www.contrahour.com/contrahour/files/ 
TheSwedishBankingCrisisRootsandConsequences.pdf.  (2) For the U.K.’s announcement with respect to 
insuring U.K. depositors in the branch of a failing Icelandic bank, see Press Release, HM Treasury, 
Statement by the Chancellor on Financial Stability (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
statement_chx_081008.htm.  (3) In May 1984 , the U.S. insured all deposits, notwithstanding deposit 
limits, in Continental of Illinois, a bank with largely commercial depositors and the 7th largest bank with 
$45 billion in assets.  See AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980’S AND EARLY 
1990’S: CONTINENTAL OF ILLINOIS AND ‘TOO BIG TO FAIL’ 2 (1997), available at 
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.  More recently in the midst of the 2007–2009 crisis, 
the Federal Reserve on October 21, 2008 granted a loan of $540 billion to support money market mutual 
funds, following an earlier smaller guarantee announced by the U.S. Treasury on September 19.  The 
media pointed out the vulnerability of the mutual funds to redemptions.  See Craig Torres & Christopher 
Condon, Fed to Provide up to $540 Billion to Aid Money Funds, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 21, 2008, available 
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of assets by the investing public in turn caused a broadening 
and deepening of the downward spiral as products were 
converted to cash, which in turn accelerated and exacerbated 
leveraged institutions’ losses and need to roll over credit 
arrangements.  Principles 24 and 29 require contingency plans 
but little guidance is given as to what these should contain.  
The CPSS/IOSCO standards require that customer funds not 
be treated as funds of the broker.  There is no guidance on 
insolvency or compensation funds. 
 Users of cross-border markets found that their funds were not 
retrievable in the manner, time, and amounts expected.  Why?  
Administration and insolvency schemes were widely 
divergent and no globally-respected, market-oriented plan for 
promptly addressing the return of positions and funds of 
investors was in place.  The Principles do not deal with use of 
collateral and cross-border retrieval of funds even 
conceptually. 
 Brokers and investment bankers were surprised at the extent 
to which certain interconnected risks were opaque or could 
expand exponentially.  Why?  Many did not seem to 
understand fully how synthetic and risk transfer products such 
as credit default swaps products, had binary risks, and could 
multiply leverage effects or how two-way derivatives markets 
assure losers for every winner.  The Principles do not address 
over-the-counter exposures, nor do they address risk 
measurement or transparency of all instruments. 
 Market participants found that they did not know where their 
collateral was and that they did not understand the risks of the 
products they had purchased.  Why?  Some customers had had 
their collateral re-hypothecated to support or offset dealers’ 
proprietary trading.  Some customers understandably 
substituted the views of presumed independent professional 
ratings agencies for their own, less informed due diligence.  
The Principles address proper disclosure but not all products 
for which disclosure is desirable are within the ambit of 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajw94.nC0a5w&refer=home (money 
market funds were previously explicitly uninsured).  (4) For Ireland’s reaction to the current crisis of 
guaranteeing all bank deposits, see Press Release, Ireland Dep’t of Fin., Government Increases Deposit 
Guarantee to Euro 100,000 per Depositor (Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/ 
viewdoc.asp?DocID=5466.  As the EU Directive provided for 20,000 Euros, it was rumored that this 
announcement caused deposits to move to Ireland provoking a debate within the European Union as to 
the appropriateness of allowing the level of deposit insurance to be a minimum as opposed to a 
maximum harmonization directive. 
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capital markets regulators disclosure requirements.62 
 Some U.S. proponents of consolidation of the financial 
services industry and its regulators abruptly reversed 
direction.  Why?  Because some saw insuperable conflicts 
within single institutions; because some feared firms were not 
only too big to fail, but also too big to manage or too powerful 
to regulate.  And, because some, perhaps inadvertently, 
promoted policies that would deny governmental support and 
attention to non-systemically significant institutions thereby 
potentially fostering further consolidation.  The Principles do 
not address firm structure or market structure or complexity. 
 Proponents of a national retreat from gradually moving 
toward a more unified international market in financial 
services emerged, as did the dread words “protectionism” and 
“nationalism.”63  Rhetoric was flung around, such as “banks 
have no social utility,” or particular jurisdictions are “train 
wrecks.”  Why?  This type of regulatory nationalism is a risk 
of a belief that any international regulatory regime/philosophy 
is incapable of addressing all the specific risks that are 
political threats to national authorities and nations.  After all, 
taxpayers and fiscal policies are national not international. 
This gap analysis underscores the risk of relying totally on 
compliance with standards, information exchange, and cooperation to 
address issues related to burden sharing as to which the Principles offer 
no guidance. 
B. Developing a Road Map Toward a Solution 
Having identified gaps and deficiencies the rest of the process is to 
examine what might be the various mechanisms for their remediation.  
To this end, the following process is proposed: 
First, there should be a mapping exercise to determine where 
 62. The 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, do address Credit Rating Agencies at new Principles 22 
and 23.  New Principle 22 now reads: “Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of 
oversight.  The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating agencies whose ratings are used for 
regulatory purposes are subject to registration and ongoing supervision.”  Id. at 9.  New Principle 23 
reads: “Other entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services should be subject to oversight 
and regulation appropriate to the impact their activities have on the market or the degree to which the 
regulatory system relies on them.”  Id. 
 63. Response, supra note 48, § 2.6 (“In its Communication, ‘Driving European Recovery’ (4th 
March 2009), the European Commission emphasized that ‘protectionism and a retreat towards national 
markets could only lead to stagnation, a deeper and longer recession and lost prosperity’ (page 11) and 
that ‘an unequivocal message is essential to hold off these threats’ (i.e. ‘domestic pressure to apply 
restrictive measures’)”). 
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effective cooperation and prevention of market and firm disruption can 
be maximized by transparency, comparability, equivalence, and reliance. 
Second, existing measures for combating contagion from an 
unhealthy to a healthy institution should be surveyed, for example: the 
Windsor Declaration,64 the Boca Declaration (with specific information 
exchange points), and the Tokyo Communiqué, supra; various regimes 
for protection of customer assets, including segregation, insurance or 
other compensation schemes; liquidity facilities, including ad hoc 
facilities; market protective insolvency regimes, including provision for 
portability of accounts; and certain private sector systems for better 
understanding cumulative risks, such as the old Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (SAFE) system that aggregated data on exposures including 
margin surpluses and deficits across markets and compared information 
on trends and differences in excess of specified tolerances on a daily, 
weekly, monthly, bi-yearly, and yearly basis. 
Third, determine what, if any, incentives/best practices are, or should 
be, in place for regulated entities to protect themselves from financial 
loss or mispricing risks due to incomplete information, such as through 
trader mis-recording or late confirmation of trades. 
Fourth, review existing IOSCO guidance on information necessary to 
address firm and market disruptions, especially with relation to large 
market moves, and update that guidance based on a review of the 
various existing surveillance regimes for market disruption across 
markets. 
Fifth, develop a library of case studies on vulnerabilities experienced 
in various jurisdictions and the policy responses thereto. 
Sixth, develop more guidance on implementation of the Principles, 
including any additional principles intended to address the issues not 
currently covered, with examples. 
Seventh, share information with other sectoral regulators, including 
banking, insurance, pensions, and compensation schemes, on IOSCO’s 
results. 
Eighth, conduct crisis scenario exercises, including cross-sectoral 
scenario exercises, to expose unexpected vulnerabilities, including 
technological vulnerabilities. 
Ninth, further cultivate informal networking among regulators and 
standard setters but expand this to cross-sectoral (banking, insurance, 
securities, and any other non-banking financial institutions) networking. 
Tenth, develop an internal review or appellate process for debating 
and resolving issues related to key Principle compliance. 
 64. This is attached as Annex II. 
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An action plan along the foregoing lines should move the process 
within IOSCO toward meeting the promise that the Principles were to be 
an evolving, living framework that responds to changes in the 
environment.  It would also help to assure that compliance with 
international standards buttresses regulatory, national and international 
resilience to meet ongoing and future financial stresses and strains. 
Some of these issues are already firmly on the table, but more 
progress could be made.65 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite improvement in the markets and the economy, the markets 
remain fragile and repairing the financial system remains an urgent 
priority.  The financial services industry is a major employer and, when 
held properly accountable to the public, an engine of economic wealth. 
And a lot is at stake. 
It is important that planned remedial actions do not delude us into 
thinking an unsolved problem is solved.  Cooperation alone cannot 
succeed without recognition of the public policy interests of national 
jurisdictions and strong national enforcement of the requirements 
relating to individual institutions and jurisdictions.  Cooperation cannot 
succeed where institutions distrust available information, suspect that 
needed information exchange will not occur in a timely fashion,66 or 
where there are insufficient assets to satisfy all creditors and so-called 
burden-sharing among jurisdictions and stakeholders is unavoidable.  
Cooperation without more will not resolve the issue of disputed claims 
to the same capital, inconsistent measurements of risk and liquidity, 
inter-related exposures that are opaque, or the design of contracts that 
take advantage of junior lenders, have unvalued optionality, or cause 
perverse incentives. 
Many of the standards, not just the IOSCO standards, as they stand 
may not really speak to these types of vulnerabilities in a comprehensive 
 65. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. ON SEC. COMM’NS, MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK: A 
ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATORS (2011), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD347.pdf. 
 66. The CFTC Part 30 exemption required requesting foreign broker dealers to be sponsored by a 
regulatory (or private regulatory) authority, consent to jurisdiction in the U.S., limits direct operations, 
trade in only non-U.S. derivatives, certify (and have their sponsoring jurisdiction certify) that they 
would not be barred from recognition in the U.S. by U.S. statutory disqualification or fitness standards, 
provide for dispute resolution arrangements that are convenient for U.S. customers, assure the proper 
treatment of customer funds, and provide disclosure that the operative regulatory requirements might not 
be identical to those in the U.S. 17 C.F.R. § 30, App. A (2010).  Such arrangements, in place since 1989, 
should be models for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of oversight of entities where cross-
border transacting is permitted. 
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way.  Efforts should be made to more clearly identify and address, or 
indicate where there is no intention to address, these limitations.  If great 
expectations for the standards are maintained by the political community 
and these are disappointed in fact by regulators, the consequences are 
unlikely to be good.  These known in advance limitations could prevent 
broader needed reform or taint other clearly worthwhile cooperative 
initiatives, such as access and other arrangements that depend on 
cooperative information sharing.67  It would be a pity if the consequence 
of potential failures due to the known limits of cooperative measures 
might cause needed, operating cooperative measures to address cross-
border activities by entities supervised by non-national supervisors or 
their customers to be eschewed.  It would be unfortunate indeed if a 
failure to enhance or to define the limits of the Principles, caused the 
proposed remedies for this crisis to be perceived as the generator of the 
next. 
 67. The EU Passport, the CFTC Part 30 regime, and various recognitions regimes, in 
jurisdictions as dispersed as Australia and Canada, acknowledge that a regulator may have superior 
access to information (capital, probity) about its own nationals than the regulator of another jurisdiction 
in which that national seeks to engage in cross-border operations, and concomitantly that the 
jurisdictions that grants access may have superior information about business done in that jurisdiction 
than the national regulator.  The National Futures Association (a self-regulatory authority with quasi- 
governmental status) operates a system which automatically pushes out information on changes in 
regulatory status of firms that are licensed here that have been admitted into other jurisdictions based on 
their U.S. license.  See Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Who We Are, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-about-
nfa/index.HTML (last visited July 31, 2010).  Currently ten jurisdictions take advantage of this system. 
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Annex I-A: IOSCO Principles as of 199868 
 
A. Principles Relating to the Regulator 
 
 1  The responsibilities of the regulator should be clear and objectively 
stated. 
 
 2  The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable 
in the exercise of its functions and powers. 
 
 3  The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and 
the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers. 
 
 4  The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory 
processes. 
 
 5  The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional 
standards including appropriate standards of confidentiality. 
 
B. Principles for Self-Regulation 
 
6  The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight 
responsibility for their respective areas of competence, to the extent 
appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets. 
 
7  SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should 
observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising 
powers and delegated responsibilities. 
 
C. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
 
8  The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation 
and surveillance powers. 
 
9  The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers. 
 
10  The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use 
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and 
implementation of an effective compliance program. 
 
 68. The following material is copied from IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at i–iii. 
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D. Principles for Cooperation in Regulation 
 
11  The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-
public information with domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
12  Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that 
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public 
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
13  The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided 
to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their 
functions and exercise of their powers. 
 
E. Principles for Issuers 
 
14  There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial 
results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions. 
 
15  Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and 
equitable manner. 
 
16  Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and 
internationally acceptable quality. 
 
F. Principles for Collective Investment Schemes 
 
17  The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and 
the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective 
investment scheme. 
 
18  The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the 
legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the 
segregation and protection of client assets. 
 
19  Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the 
principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a 
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of 
the investor’s interest in the scheme. 
 
20  Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis 
for assets valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a 
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collective investment scheme. 
 
G. Principles for Market Intermediaries 
 
21  Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for 
market Intermediaries. 
 
22  There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential 
requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the 
intermediaries undertake. 
 
23  Market intermediaries should be required to comply with 
standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to 
protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and 
under which management of the intermediary accepts primary 
responsibility for these matters. 
 
24  There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a 
market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors 
and to contain systemic risk. 
 
H. Principles for the Secondary Market 
 
25  The establishment of trading systems including securities 
exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight. 
 
26  There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and 
trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading 
is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate 
balance between the demands of different market participants. 
 
27  Regulation should promote transparency of trading. 
 
28  Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation 
and other unfair trading practices. 
 
29  Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large 
exposures, default risk and market disruption. 
 
30  Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions 
should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that 
they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk. 
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Annex I-B: IOSCO Principles as of June 201069 
 
A. Principles Relating to the Regulator 
 
1  The responsibilities of the Regulator should be clear and 
objectively stated. 
 
2  The Regulator should be operationally independent and 
accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers. 
 
3  The Regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and 
the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers. 
 
4  The Regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory 
processes. 
 
5  The staff of the Regulator should observe the highest professional 
standards, including appropriate standards of confidentiality. 
 
6  The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, 
mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate. 
 
7  The Regulator should have or contribute to a process to review the 
perimeter of regulation regularly. 
 
8  The Regulator should seek to ensure that conflicts of interest and 
misalignment of incentives are avoided, eliminated, disclosed or 
otherwise managed. 
 
B. Principles for Self-Regulation 
 
9  Where the regulatory system [regime should] makes [appropriate] 
use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct 
oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence, [to the 
extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets] such SROs 
should be subject to the oversight of the Regulator and should observe 
standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and 
delegated responsibilities.70 
 
 69. The following material is copied from 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 4–12.  Italics 
represent additions to the 1998 text, and brackets represent deletions. 
 70. New Principle 9 combines former Principles 6 and 7.  See 2010 PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at 
5.  Former Principle 6 read: “The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory 
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C. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
 
10  The Regulator should have comprehensive inspection, 
investigation and surveillance powers. 
 
11  The Regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers. 
 
12  The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use 
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and 
implementation of an effective compliance program. 
 
D. Principles for Cooperation in Regulation 
 
13  The Regulator should have authority to share both public and non-
public information with domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
14  Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that 
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public 
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
15  The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided 
to foreign Regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of 
their functions and exercise of their powers. 
 
E. Principles for Issuers 
 
16  There should be full, accurate and timely disclosure of financial 
results, risk and other information which [that] is material to investors’ 
decisions. 
 
17  Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and 
equitable manner. 
 
18  Accounting [and auditing] standards used by issuers to prepare 




Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of 
competence, to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.”  IOSCO PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 6, at i. 
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F. Principles for Auditors, Credit Ratings Agencies, and other 
information service providers 
 
19  Auditors should be subject to adequate levels of oversight. 
 
20  Auditors should be independent of the issuing entity that they 
audit. 
 
21  Audit standards should be of a high and internationally 
acceptable quality. 
 
22  Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of 
oversight.  The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating 
agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes are subject to 
registration and ongoing supervision. 
 
23  Other entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services 
should be subject to oversight and regulation appropriate to the impact 
their activities have on the market or the degree to which the regulatory 
system relies on them. 
 
G. Principles for Collective Investment Schemes 
 
24  The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility, [and 
the regulation] governance, organization and operational conduct of 
those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme. 
 
25  The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the 
legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the 
segregation and protection of client assets. 
 
26  Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the 
principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a 
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of 
the investor’s interest in the scheme. 
 
27  Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis 
for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a 
collective investment scheme. 
 
28  Regulation should ensure that [there is a proper and disclosed 
basis for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a 
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collective investment scheme] hedge funds and/or hedge funds 
managers/advisers are subject to appropriate oversight. 
 
H. Principles for Market Intermediaries 
 
29  Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for 
market intermediaries. 
 
30  There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential 
requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the 
intermediaries undertake. 
 
31  Market intermediaries should be required to [comply] establish an 
internal function that delivers compliance with standards for internal 
organization and operational conduct, [that] with the aim [to] of 
protecting the interests of clients and their assets and ensuring proper 
management of risk, [and under] through which management of the 
intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters. 
 
32  There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a 
market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors 
and to contain systemic risk. 
 
I. Principles for Secondary Markets 
 
33  The establishment of trading systems including securities 
exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight. 
 
34  There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and 
trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading 
is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate 
balance between the demands of different market participants. 
 
35  Regulation should promote transparency of trading. 
 
36  Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation 
and other unfair trading practices. 
 
37  Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large 
exposures, default risk and market disruption. 
 
38  [Systems for clearing and settlement of securities] Securities 
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settlement systems and central counterparties should be subject to 
regulatory [oversight, and] and supervisory requirements that are 
designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they 
reduce systemic risk. 
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Annex I-C: FSB Cooperation Standards List71 
 
Regulatory and supervisory standards concerning international 
cooperation and information exchange 
 
There are three key standards in the financial regulatory and 
supervisory area: the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, the IAIS Insurance Core Principles, and the IOSCO 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.  The FSB in 
consultation with the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO identified, within each of 
these standards, principles concerning international cooperation and 
information exchange.  This built on earlier work by the Financial 
Stability Forum to identify a list of standards for priority 
implementation. 
The principles listed below were selected based on two criteria: 
principles that relate directly to cooperation and information exchange, 
and principles that relate to essential supervisory powers and practices, 
without which effective cooperation and information exchange cannot 
take place.  While the issues covered by some of the principles listed 
below are broader than cooperation and information exchange, these 
principles are the most relevant to the focus of the FSB.  Principles that 
solely or mainly concern cooperation and information exchange in the 
areas of tax, anti-money laundering or combating the financing of 
terrorism were excluded because adherence to these is evaluated by 
other international bodies, notably the OECD and FATF. 
 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
 
Licensing and Structure 
 
3.  Licensing criteria: The licensing authority must have the power to 
set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the 
standards set.  The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an 
assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and 
its wider group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members 
and senior management, its strategic and operating plan, internal 
controls and risk management, and its projected financial condition, 
including its capital base.  Where the proposed owner or parent 
organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country 
supervisor should be obtained. 
 
 71. The following material is copied from FSB FRAMEWORK, supra note 4, at 6–8 (internal 
citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision 
 
21.  Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of 
collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and statistical 
returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means 
of independent verification of these reports, through either on-site 
examinations or use of external experts. 
 
Consolidated and cross-border banking supervision 
 
24.  Consolidated supervision: An essential element of banking 
supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group on a 
consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying 
prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group 
worldwide. 
 
25.  Home-host relationships: Cross-border consolidated supervision 
requires cooperation and information exchange between home 
supervisors and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host 
banking supervisors.  Banking supervisors must require the local 
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as 
those required of domestic institutions. 
 
Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (IAIS) 
 
The supervisory system 
 
5.  Supervisory cooperation and information sharing: The 
supervisory authority cooperates and shares information with other 
relevant supervisors subject to confidentiality requirements. 
 
The supervised entity 
 
6.  Licensing: An insurer must be licensed before it can operate within a 
jurisdiction.  The requirements for licensing are clear, objective and 
public. 
 
7.  Suitability of persons: The significant owners, board members, 
senior management, auditors and actuaries of an insurer are fit and 
proper to fulfil their roles.  This requires that they possess the 
appropriate integrity, competency, experience and qualifications. 
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Ongoing supervision 
 
17.  Group-wide supervision: The supervisory authority supervises its 
insurers on a solo and a group-wide basis. 
 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO) 
 
B. Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
 
8.  The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation 
and surveillance powers. 
 
9.  The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers. 
 
10.  The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use 
of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and 
implementation of an effective compliance program. 
 
D. Principles for Co-operation in Regulation 
 
11.  The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-
public information with domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
12.  Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that 
set out when and how they will share both public and non-public 
information with their domestic and foreign counterparts. 
 
13.  The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to 
foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their 
functions and exercise of their powers. 
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Annex II: Windsor Declaration72 
 
Representatives of Regulatory Bodies from 16 Countries 
Responsible for Supervising the Activities of the World’s Major 
Futures and Options Markets (collectively, the “Authorities”) met 
on 16 and 17 May 1995 at Windsor in the United Kingdom and 
determined to Issue the Windsor Declaration. 
 
. . . 
 
THE AUTHORITIES reviewed recent developments in, and discussed 
the regulatory implications of, the increasing volume of cross-border 
transactions on international futures and options exchanges increasingly 
linked by common members and participants and similar products. 
 
THE AUTHORITIES took note of previous work on international 
regulatory co-operation and exchanged views on specific co-operative 
measures to strengthen regulatory supervision, minimise systemic risk 
and enhance customer protection with a view to preventing or containing 
the adverse effects of financial disruptions.  In particular, they addressed 
issues related to: 
 
 Co-operation between market authorities 
 Protection of customer positions, funds and assets 
 Default procedures 
 Regulatory co-operation in emergencies 
 
THE AUTHORITIES noted that these are issues of importance to all 
futures and options exchanges, and clearing houses (collectively, 
“markets”) in consequence of which: 
 
I. THE AUTHORITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING POINTS 
OF CONSENSUS 
 
That increasingly, members of one market or companies materially 
associated with such members, trade for themselves or customers in 
multiple jurisdictions.  Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that 
enhanced co-operation and communications occurs as necessary 
 
 72. The following material is copied from U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 
International Initiatives: Windsor Declaration, http://www.cftc.gov/International/ 
InternationalInitiatives/oia_windsordeclaration.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2010) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
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between regulators and/or market authorities to minimise the adverse 
consequences of market disruptions caused by defaults or other failures.  
This is because an individual regulator or market authority alone may 
not have information on all material exposures of market members, 
financial intermediaries and any materially associated companies.  
ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities will support, subject to appropriate 
confidentiality protections, mechanisms to improve prompt 
communication of information relevant to material exposures and other 
regulatory concerns. 
 
That protection of customer positions, funds and assets carried by 
financial intermediaries plays an important role in customer protection 
and the reduction of the potential for systemic risk.  ACCORDINGLY, 
the Authorities will review the adequacy of existing arrangements to 
minimise the risk of loss through insolvency or misappropriation and 
enhance such arrangements as appropriate. 
 
That effective exchange and clearing house default procedures coupled 
with other regulatory measures, such as effective margining systems, 
can mitigate the risk of losses arising from the inability of solvent 
participants to close out or manage their exposures to a failing market 
member and the consequent potential for systemic failure.  
ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities, cognisant of national insolvency 
regimes, will promote as appropriate national provisions and market 
procedures that facilitate the prompt liquidation and/or transfer of 
positions, funds and assets, from failing members of futures exchanges. 
 
That recent market developments require effective international co-
ordination and timely communication of reliable information which is 
essential for supervisory purposes when a financial intermediary, a 
market member, or a market experiences material financial or 
operational difficulties.  ACCORDINGLY, the Authorities will support 
measures to enhance emergency procedures at financial intermediaries, 
market members and markets and to improve existing mechanisms for 
international co-operation and communication among market authorities 
and regulators. 
 
II. THE AUTHORITIES AGREED TO PROMOTE 
 
 Active surveillance within each jurisdiction of large exposures 
by market authorities and/or regulators as appropriate. 
 Development of mechanisms to ensure that customer 
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positions, funds and assets can be separately identified and 
held safe to the maximum extent possible and in accordance 
with national law. 
 Enhanced disclosure by the markets of the different types and 
levels of protection of customer funds and assets which may 
prevail, particularly when they are transferred to different 
jurisdictions, including through omnibus accounts. 
 Record-keeping systems at exchanges and clearing houses 
and/or market members which ensure that positions, funds 
and assets to be treated as belonging to customers can be 
satisfactorily distinguished from other positions, funds and 
assets. 
 Enhanced disclosure by markets to participants of the rules 
and procedures governing what constitutes a default and the 
treatment of positions, funds and assets of member firms and 
their clients in the event of such a default. 
 The immediate designation by each regulator of a contact 
point for receiving information or providing other assistance 
to other regulators and/or market authorities and the means to 
assure twenty-four hour availability of contact personnel in 
the event of disruption occurring at a financial intermediary, 
market member or market. 
 Review of existing lists and assuring maintenance by IOSCO 
of an international regulatory contracts list. 
 The development by financial intermediaries, market 
members or markets and regulatory authorities of contingency 
arrangements, or a review of the adequacy of existing 
arrangements, and enhancement as appropriate. 
 
III. THE AUTHORITIES RECOMMENDED THAT FURTHER 
WORK SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE APPROPRIATE 
INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO CONSIDER 
 
1. With respect to co-operation between market authorities: 
 
A survey of current procedures for identifying large exposures in 
individual markets; 
 
The type of information which may assist regulators and markets to 
evaluate the exposure of market members, financial intermediaries and 
any materially associated companies; 
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The circumstances, including triggers or thresholds, for obtaining such 
information; 
 
Mechanisms whereby large exposure and other relevant information is 
and could be shared on a bilateral or multilateral basis among regulators 
and markets; 
 
Arrangements to ensure confidentiality and that such information is used 
solely for the regulatory purpose for which it was provided; and 
 
Arrangements to strengthen the regulatory oversight of financial groups 
operating internationally. 
 
2. With respect to protection of customer positions, funds and 
assets: 
 
The current types and levels of protection in different jurisdictions with 
respect to customer funds and assets; how best to facilitate better and 
more consistent protection among jurisdictions; and how best to assure 
continued protection when funds and assets are transferred to another 
intermediary or jurisdiction or held in a bank affiliated with the 
intermediary; 
 
The development of best practices with regard to: the treatment of 
customer positions, funds and assets and how they are distinguished 
from intermediary’s own positions, funds and assets, including when 
held in omnibus accounts, with a view to maximising the safety of those 
funds and assets; and 
 
The development of best practices with regard to risk management for 
the protection of the intermediary. 
 
3. With respect to default procedures: 
 
The development of best practices by market authorities with regard to 
the treatment of positions and funds in the event of a financial disruption 
at a member firm so as to permit the prompt isolation of the problem at 
the failing firm; 
 
The development of best practices with regard to the handling of 
customer positions, funds and assets held in omnibus accounts at 
markets in the event of a default; 
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The development of standards for information to be made available to 
customers as to the default and assessment procedures of markets; 
 
The establishment of means whereby information can efficiently and 
effectively be communicated by the relevant market authorities to 
market participants in the event that default procedures are 
implemented; and 
 
The types of arrangements that might apply in the event that the position 
to be liquidated by a market is of a size that threatens the stability of the 
market. 
 
4. With respect to regulatory co-operation in emergencies: 
 
The development of best practices for control and management of a 
significant business disruption by financial intermediaries, market 
members and markets. 
 
The Chairman of the Technical Committee of IOSCO and the 
Secretary General of IOSCO, who attended the Windsor meeting, 
endorsed the proposal to take matters forward promptly under the 
auspices of IOSCO, in close consultation with the markets and market 
authorities. 
 
The Authorities Further Agreed That the work identified above 
should begin immediately through the Technical Committee of IOSCO.  
The Chairmen of the Securities Investments Board and Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission have been invited to report interim 
progress at the next meeting of the Technical Committee in Paris on 9 
and 10 July. 
 




Australian Securities Commission 
 
Brazil 
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Commission des Valeurs Mobilières du Québec 
Ontario Securities Commission 
 
France 
Commission des Opérations de Bourse 
 
Germany 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel 
 
Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission 
 
Italy 
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa 
 
Japan 
Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance 
 
Netherlands 
Securities Board of the Netherlands 
 
Singapore 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
 
South Africa 
Financial Services Board 
 
Spain 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
 
Sweden 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
Switzerland 
The Federal Banking Commission 
 
United States of America 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
United Kingdom 
Securities and Investments Board 
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Particular note was taken of the following reports produced by IOSCO’s 
Technical Committee: 
 
 Principals for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates 
(October 1992). 
 Mechanisms to Enhance Open and Timely Communication 
between Market Authorities of Related Cash and Derivative 
Markets during Periods of Market Disruption (October 1993). 
 Operational and Financial Risk Management Control 
Mechanisms for the Over the Counter Derivatives Activities 
of Regulated Securities Firms (July 1994). 
 Framework for Supervisory Information about the Derivatives 
Activities of Banks and Securities Firms (Joint Paper with the 
Basle Committee of Banking Supervision (May 1995)). 
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